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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
During the past few years, there has been heated debate-both domestically and 
internationally-about China's exchange rate policy. At the heart of the debate are two 
fundamental issues: First, is the renminbi undervalued? If so, by how much; and second, toward 
what exchange rate regime should China move? This paper sheds light on the first issue by 
examining the "equilibrium" value of the renminbi and its alleged undervaluation, but focuses on 
the second issue- in particular, the risks to financial stability and the domestic costs of China's 
current exchange rate regime. By reviewing a large number of Chinese and western literatures on 
a series of specific issues pertaining to China's exchange rate policy such as: the revolution of 
the renminbi exchange rate regime since the start of the economic reforms 30 plus years ago; the 
"equilibrium" value of the renminbi and its alleged undervaluation; China's fast growing current 
account surplus in recent years and its contributing factors; the risks to financial stability and 
other domestic costs of China's current rigid exchange rate regime, this paper finds that the latest 
debates on the renminbi exchange rate regime in China mirror those in the west. In other words, 
there are same rival camps both inside and outside China. The synthesis of their findings is that 
greater exchange rate flexibility can resolve many of the challenges and obstacles posed by 
China's current tightly managed exchange rate regime. 
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION AND PREVIEW 
Since its opening up to the outside world and the series of economic reforms it 
started to adopt in the late 1970s, China's economic performance has been one of the 
strongest in history with annual gross domestic product (GOP) growth averaging nearly 10 
percent over the 1980-2010 period, compared to 4.5 percent for all emerging and 
developing economies over the same period (IMF, 2011).1 Although the country's per 
capita income is still modest at USD$3,678 in 2009 (World Bank, 2011), with almost one 
fifth of the world's population, China surpassed Japan as the world's second-largest 
economy after the United States by both nominal GOP and by purchasing power parity 
(PPP) in the second quarter of 2010, according to a well-known economist with the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) named Ming Zhang (2010a). Following three 
decades of rapid economic expansion, China has also become the second largest trading 
nation in the world and the largest exporter and second largest importer of goods. The 
package of macroeconomic and structural policy reforms that has generated this growth 
has clearly worked well for China. Nevertheless, the Chinese authorities need to deal with a 
much more complicated economic situation than ever before as the country is facing 
macroeconomic, social and environmental challenges that have their origin in its pattern of 
growth. 
Together with other structural reforms that have opened up the Chinese economy to 
foreign investment and trade, a tightly managed exchange rate regime has been one 
important part of a development strategy that promotes export-led economic growth in 
China over the past three decades or so. Since the late 1970s and prior to 2005, as China's 
1 Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database for April 2011 and author's own calculations. 
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economic reforms and liberalization process moved forward, its exchange rate regime had 
gradually evolved from a "centrally planned administrative mechanism to a dual-rate 
system, then to a managed float with a narrow band, and finally to a managed float with a 
very narrow band-a de facto peg to the [U.S.] dollar" (Huang & Wang, 2004, p.337). 
According to Zhichao Zhang (2000), with the deepening of market-oriented reforms in the 
mid-1980s, the exchange rate was for the first time recognized by the Chinese authorities 
as an "economic lever" that should be applied to promote exports. That is also when 
exchange rate reform was first launched in China. In July 2005, the renminbi's decade long 
peg to the U.S. dollar was formally changed when China launched a much-heralded 
currency reform. However, despite pledges by the Chinese authorities in recent years to 
increase the role of market forces in the determination of the renminbi exchange rate, and 
to manage a floating exchange rate against a basket of currencies rather than the U.S. dollar 
alone, in practice, the renminbi still appears to be pegged to the dollar, with little flexibility. 
During the past few years, there has been heated debate-both domestically and 
internationally-about China's exchange rate policy. At the heart of the debate are two 
fundamental issues: First, is the renminbi undervalued? If so, by how much; and second, 
toward what exchange rate regime should China move? This paper sheds light on the first 
issue by examining the "equilibrium" value of the renminbi and its alleged undervaluation, 
but focuses on the second issue-in particular, the risks to financial stability and the 
domestic costs of China's current exchange rate regime. By reviewing a large number of 
articles on a series of specific issues pertaining to China's exchange rate policy such as: the 
revolution of the renminbi exchange rate regime since the start of the economic reforms 30 
plus years ago; the "equilibrium" value of the renminbi and its alleged undervaluation; 
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China's fast growing current account surplus in recent years and its contributing factors; 
the risks to financial stability and other domestic costs of China's current rigid exchange 
rate regime, this paper aims to synthesize findings by analysts and policymakers from both 
inside and outside China (some written in Chinese) and act as the culmination of a study of 
the latest debate on China's exchange rate policy. 
At the current stage of development, China needs to employ monetary policy to 
accommodate some broad objectives such as price stability, balanced balance-of-payments 
(BOP) account, and sustainable economic growth. Since the effective management of the 
renminbi exchange rate system could help China's economy achieve all these 
macroeconomic objectives and have an impact on the country's competitiveness, trade 
relations and resources allocation, the question of an equilibrium exchange rate has been a 
major source of concern among analysts and policymakers during the current debate on 
China's exchange rate policy. The mismanagement of the renminbi exchange rate regime 
along with a misaligned renminbi, on the other hand, could negatively influence the 
stability of China's financial system, possibly resulting in regional and even global financial 
crises. 
However, according to Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy (2008, p.3), "[a]ny 
methodology that defines the equilibrium exchange rate for the renminbi as the real 
effective exchange rate 2 (REER) that would produce 'balance' in China's global current 
account position, or in its basic balance, or in its overall [BOP] position, yields the 
2 An "effective" exchange rate index is a weighted average of the country's exchange rate against its major 
trading partners, where the weights on individual currencies are typically related to the importance of that 
country in the home country's trade. A "real" exchange rate index adjusts movements in the nominal 
exchange rate for differences in inflation rates between the home and foreign country, since higher inflation 
represents a decline in price competitiveness just like an appreciation of the home currency. A "real effective" 
exchange rate index combines these two features (Goldstein, 2007). 
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qualitative conclusion that the renminbi is significantly undervalued and probably by an 
increasing margin over time." In an effort to keep the renminbi from appreciating, the 
Chinese authorities have been engaging in large-scale, one-way intervention in the foreign 
exchange market for many years. The excessive expansion of China's current account 
surplus that has accompanied, among other factors, the increasingly undervalued renminbi 
exchange rate, along with the continuous blocking of a renminbi appreciation large enough 
to substantially reduce China's current account surplus, not only imposes a constraint on 
the country's monetary policy, with increasing risk to the banking and the financial system, 
but also makes it much harder for China to move to a more balanced and sustainable 
growth path. 
First, a rigid exchange rate regime compounded by a large current account surplus 
substantially reduces the independence of monetary policy. In recent years, the growth in 
China's current account surplus-which is a by-product of the distinct features of China's 
pattern of growth and a variety of policies that are behind it, including, perhaps crucially, 
exchange rate policy-has reached unprecedented levels. Normally, a large expansion of 
current account surplus would lead to appreciation pressures on the domestic currency, 
which in turn would lead to deterioration in the country's competitive position in 
international trade. However, resisting pressures for renminbi appreciation, the People's 
Bank of China (PBOC), China's central bank, purchases a large amount of foreign exchange. 
Such rigid exchange rate arrangement fuels a surge in the supply of base money and 
generates a "liquidity overhang" in the Chinese banking system. At the current juncture, 
relatively high domestic interest rates would be needed to cool down the "overheated" 
economy and to prevent risks of hyperinflation. However, the paradox is that higher 
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interest rates would trigger speculative capital inflows, which in turn would put more 
upward pressures on the renminbi exchange rate. Moreover, China's massive intervention 
in the foreign exchange market has resulted in the accumulation of a large hoarding of 
foreign exchange reserves reaching USD$3.04 trillion in March 2011, according to figures 
released by the central bank3 (PBOC, 2011), mainly in the forms of U.S. dollars and U.S. 
dollar-denominated assets give a number here for the reserve holdings that puts the 
country at risk for potential capital losses in the event of U.S. dollar depreciation. 
Next, China's current exchange rate arrangement given its extraordinarily large 
foreign exchange reserves has negative implications for the profitability and efficiency of 
the domestic banking system, which in turn may hamper banking sector reforms. In order 
to prevent any large movement of the renminbi exchange rate, the PBOC intervenes 
massively in the foreign exchange market. This in turn increases the supply of monetary 
aggregates and thus generates excessive liquidity in the Chinese banking system. The PBOC 
is then forced to engage in large-scale, open-market sterilization operations to keep 
domestic inflation at bay. Such sterilization operations are normally carried out through 
non-market oriented tools including low-yielding sterilization bonds issued by the PBOC, 
administrative controls on bank lending and credit expansion, as well as moral suasion. 
However, the accumulating large stocks of low-yielding, non-performing liquid instruments 
on the balance sheets of commercial banks raise concerns over bank profitability as "the 
true cost of sterilization is partly transferred off the balance sheet of the central bank and 
onto the balance sheet of the banking system" (Cappiello & Ferrucci, 2008, p.8). In addition, 
3 According to Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008, p.16), "China's stock of foreign exchange reserves has grown 
around eightfold since the beginning of 2000, to USD$1,202 billion in March-the largest stock in the world, 
equivalent to around 46 percent of GDP." At the end of that year, the country's total foreign exchange reserves 
reached USD$1,530 billion, close to 50 percent of GDP (PBOC, 2008). 
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according to David Dollar and Shang-Jin Wei (2007), as commercial banks are constrained 
by the monetary authority to provide cheap credit to inefficient state enterprises, 
especially in the export sector, large distortion and efficiency costs have been incurred as a 
result. 
Lastly, a rigid exchange rate regime vitiates China's efforts to rebalance the sources 
of its economic growth and make it more sustainable in the long run. Over the past decade 
or so, China's exceptionally rapid economic growth has relied heavily on manufacturing, 
external demand, and investment. While the reliance on manufacturing exports in urban 
China has become a growing burden on the environment, overinvestment and the resultant 
accumulation of capital in urban industry has led to widening productivity differences, and 
therefore income inequality, between urban and rural areas (Hofman & Kuijs, 2007). On 
the one hand, these imbalances all appear linked, inter alios, to China's tightly managed 
exchange rate regime. On the other hand, a more flexible renminbi exchange rate that is 
increasingly driven by market forces can contribute to the country's desired transition to a 
more equitable and environmentally sustainable growth path by reducing the profitability 
and competitiveness of Chinese exports, and by allowing monetary authorities to raise 
domestic interest rates to moderate investment booms in the urban manufacturing export 
industry-both of which would translate into reduced export growth in China. 
As a result, this paper advocates greater flexibility in the renminbi exchange rate 
regime and thus faster revaluation of the renminbi for the sake of China's own interests. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explores the evolution of China's de 
facto exchange rate regime since the late 1970s in the context of its development strategy. 
Chapter 3 examines the renminbi's alleged undervaluation by providing an overview of the 
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different estimates of its equilibrium REER. Chapter 4 analyses China's current account 
surplus and its determinants. Chapter 5 discusses the key challenges facing the Chinese 
authorities under the existing currency regime, and makes the case for greater flexibility in 
the renminbi exchange rate. Chapter 6 offers some concluding remarks on what can and 
should be done to accelerate China's exchange rate reform. 
CHAPTER 2- CHINA'S EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES SINCE THE LATE 1970S 
2.1 Moving Toward A More Market-Based Exchange Rate Regime (1979-1994) 
In the late 1970s, China contemplated its exchange rate reform for the first time 
when general economic reforms and liberalization process focused on increasing foreign 
trade and investment were adopted by the ruling Communist Party of China. Since a 
country's choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime-be it fixed, floating, or 
intermediate-can affect its macroeconomic performance such as inflation, cross-border 
trade and capital flows, etc., exchange rate policy in China has since been regarded as a 
matter of exceptional importance. This, however, was not true before 1978 when China 
first launched its economic reforms and open-door policy. According to Zhang (2000), 
throughout its system of economic planning from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, market 
forces had virtually no role in China's administrative exchange rate arrangements. "It was a 
mere accounting device linking foreign trade and the domestic economy" (Zhang, 2000, 
p.1076). Moreover, changes in the exchange rate could not affect directly China's overall 
balance of payments as the volumes of trade and financial flows were fixed by the central 
government as part of the country's import-substitution industrialization strategy. 
"The transformation of the role, adjustment rules, and the institutional arrangement 
of the renminbi exchange rate since the late 1970s has been successful in bringing 
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'economic realism' to China's official exchange rate which was previously considered 
economically meaningless" (Wu & Chen, 1992, p.37). According to Dilip Das (2008), taking 
lessons from its dynamic Asian neighbors, the Chinese authorities soon decided to abandon 
its strategy of keeping the currency overvalued for the simple reason that a competitively 
priced renminbi was imperative for adopting an export-led growth strategy like that in 
Japan and other high-performing Asian economies. This in fact explains why in the post 
1978 period the renminbi exchange rate, which had long been fixed at overvalued levels, 
was devalued repeatedly over a long period of time as economic policies became 
increasingly pro-trade (Das, 2008). 
In early 1981, in an effort to improve the profitability of exporters and the 
competitiveness of Chinese exports in the global market place, the PBOC conducted a major 
exchange rate reform exercise in which a dual exchange rate system was introduced-that 
is, the official exchange rate coexisted with a market-determined, trade-related internal 
settlement rate. According to Goldstein and Lardy (2009), at that point the official rate was 
RMB1.5 to the dollar, so the internal settlement rate of RMB2.8 was a devaluation of almost 
100 percent. Whereas the official rate was adjusted periodically in response to changes in 
the value of a basket of currencies and was used mainly to cover non-trade, service-related 
transactions such as overseas Chinese remittances, tourism, etc., the internal settlement 
rate was pegged exclusively do the U.S. dollar and was applied to all current account 
transactions (Goldstein & Lardy, 2009). 
Over the next few years, the official exchange rate was further devalued. It 
eventually unified with the internal settlement rate on January 1, 1985 when the PBOC 
formally abandoned the latter (Goldstein & Lardy, 2009). In 1986, however, a dual 
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exchange rate system re-emerged in China with the establishment of Foreign Exchange 
Adjustment Centers or "swap centers" (Das, 2008). As Das (2008) expounds, under this 
new dual-track system, the official exchange rate coexisted with a market-driven, swap 
center rate that was "depreciating over time in response to economic fundamentals." 
Foreign investors along with domestic enterprises in the four Special Economic Zones 
namely Shantou, Shenzhen, Xiamen and Zhuhai, were permitted to trade foreign exchange 
on the basis of negotiations between sellers and buyers at over 100 swap centers nation-
wide. And by 1988, all Chinese enterprises with foreign exchange earnings were allowed to 
make use of the swap center rates (Das, 2008). 
As economic liberalization and the opening-up process accelerated in the late 1980s, 
the PBOC progressively devalued the official rate in an effort to close the gap between it 
and the market rates. According to Lardy (2002), in a single step on July 5, 1986, the official 
rate depreciated by 15 percent to RMB3. 7 per dollar from its mid-1986 rate of RMB3.2. A 
further devaluation in December 1989 took the official rate to RMB4. 7 per dollar. In 1991, 
the Chinese authorities summarized the objectives of the renminbi exchange rate reform 
as: (1) rationalizing the level of the exchange rate and (2) making full play of the exchange 
rate as an economic lever that should be applied to promote exports (Yin et al., 1991). Over 
the next four years, the PBOC continued to devalue the official renminbi exchange rate until 
it reached RMB5.8 per dollar at year-end 1993 (Lardy, 2002). Figure 2.1 plots the nominal 
US dollar exchange rate of the renminbi for the period 1981 to 1994. 
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Figure 2 .1 
Dual (Nominal US dollar) Exchange Rates of the 
Renminbi. 1981- 1994 
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On January 1, 1994, a major revamp of China's exchange rate system was carried out 
when the official exchange rate was devalued further to unify with the prevailing swap rate 
of RM88. 7 per dollar4 (Das, 2006). In other words, the dual exchange rate system in China 
was formally abandoned. At the same time, the Chinese monetary authorities introduced a 
unified, managed floating exchange rate regime with a narrow band of ±0.3 percent around 
the reference rate set by the PBOC for interbank transactions (Yi, 2008). Under the new 
structure, the renminbi exchange rate was revalued until it reached RMB8.3 per dollar in 
June 1995, and then slowly moved to RMB8.28 by October 1997 (Huang & Wang, 2004 ). 
However, from that time up to the new renminbi exchange rate reform initiated on July 21, 
2005, the nominal value of the renminbi vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar was actually allowed to 
fluctuate within a margin of less than ±1 percent around the de facto fixed rate ofRM88.28, 
as noted by Yi (2008). Thus, albeit China claimed to have a managed floating renminbi 
exchange rate during that period, it "essentially operated its exchange rate system as a de 
4 According to Das (2006), the official exchange rate jumped from RMBS.S to the dollar to RMB8. 7 which 
amounted to a devaluation of 32.09 percent in nominal terms. 
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facto peg to the U.S. dollar" (Das, 2008, p.61). Figure 2.2 plots the nominal US dollar 
exchange rate of the renminbi for the period 1994 to 2005. 
Figure 2 .2 
Nominal US Dollar Ex change Rate of the Renminbi, 1994- 2005 
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In fact, expounds Das (2008, p.59), the option for a de facto U.S. dollar peg during 
the 1997-2005 period was regarded by the Chinese authorities as "an essential factor for 
vitalizing the external sector." The overarching feature of China's exchange rate reform 
thus far corroborated the fact that a relatively higher weight had been attributed to 
external competitiveness in its objective function (Zhang, 2000). As the renminbi-U.S. 
dollar bilateral exchange rate remained normally stable during that period despite rapid 
real GDP growth, rising total factor productivity, robust export expansion and massive 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows-all these factors would theoretically lead to 
currency appreciation, China's exports were given a substantive competitive advantage in 
relation to other exporting economies. 
2.3 New Managed Floating Exchange Rate Regime (Post 2005) 
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The decade-long fixed nominal exchange rate of the renminbi vis-a-vis the U.S. 
dollar had served the Chinese economy well-in particular the export sector. However, in 
recent years, it has, along with other factors, contributed to huge internal and external 
imbalances in the country. For example, according to Goldstein and Lardy (2009), in 2008 
China's current account surplus stood at USD$426 billion or 9.8 percent of the preliminary 
GDP announced by the government in January 2009 (see figure 4.1). The increase of 
USD$54 billion compared with 2007 was primarily due to the increase in the trade surplus 
(Goldstein & Lardy, 2009). Figure 2.3 displays China's balance oftrade from 2005 to 2008. 
Faced with increasing pressures to move toward a more flexible exchange rate regime and 
to let the renminbi appreciate monotonically in accordance with market forces, the PBOC 
on July 21, 2005 introduced a new managed float exchange rate system with reference to a 
basket of currencies rather than the U.S. dollar alone. Most importantly, the PBOC said that 
the renminbi exchange rate was to become more flexible with its value based more on 
market supply and demand (PBOC, 2005). According to Goldstein and Lardy (2008), under 
the new renminbi exchange rate regime, the official renminbi-U.S. dollar nominal exchange 
rate was immediately adjusted from RMB8.28 to RMB8.11 to the dollar, amounting to a 2.1 
percent appreciation against the dollar. By the end of 2008, the nominal renminbi-U.S. 
dollar exchange rate was RMB6.83, reflecting a cumulative appreciation of 21 percent 
compared with that in July 2005 (Goldstein & Lardy, 2008). 
12 
Figure 2.3 CHINA BALANCE OF TRADE 
~a..a-::> :f T~a:r l~·i.J :- .. :;J 
Jul / 05 Jan/0 6 Jul/06 Jan /0 7 Jul / 07 Jan/ 08 
Source: TradingEconomics.com; General Admin istration of Custom 
Turning from the size and variability of renminbi exchange rate changes to the 
"basket" characteristics of China post-2005 currency regime, Frankel and Wei (2007) found 
that the renminbi continued to trace the U.S. dollar. In other words, only a limited degree of 
flexibility was introduced as a result of the exchange rate reforms of July 21, 2005. On 
August 10, 2005, for example, the PBOC published the currencies which made up the 
currency basket. It included the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen and the Korean won 
as the four first tier currencies that have the largest weights. Albeit the weight of each 
individual currency, which reflected China's geographical distribution of trade, services, 
and capital flows, has been kept confidential, it is not difficult to imagine that the U.S. dollar 
heavily dominated the weights in the currency basket (Das, 2008). 
Since the onset of the global financial crisis in late 2008, however, the PBOC 
effectively re-pegged the renminbi near 6.83 per dollar to provide stability to its export 
sector in light of weakened external demand. As the recovery and upturn of the Chinese 
economy became more solid a couple of years later, the PBOC said on June 20, 2010-just 
one week before the G-20 meeting in Toronto-that it would proceed further with its 
currency reform by allowing more flexibility in the renminbi exchange rate, despite the fact 
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that no timeframe for the change was given. For example, in a Chinese articled published in 
International Finance in August 2010, economist Sibo Wang (2010) points out that since 
the PBOC announced the restart of the renminbi exchange rate regime reform a month ago, 
the nominal RMB-USD bilateral exchange rate has experienced rapid appreciation only in 
the initial stage and two-way fluctuations after that. Wang (2010)'s article examines from 
two aspects the trend of the renminbi exchange rate during this period: the flexibility of the 
renminbi exchange rate in relation to the currency basket and the speed of the renminbi 
appreciation on the initiative, discovering that the renminbi has in fact not appreciated on 
the initiative. In addition, the PBOC ruled out a one-time revaluation of the renminbi by 
saying that there was no basis for a large-scale appreciation, and kept the renminbi's 0.5 
percent daily trading band against the U.S. dollar unchanged. Figure 2.3 plots the nominal 
US dollar exchange rate of the renminbi for the post 2005 period. 
Figure 2.4 
Nominal US Dollar Exchange Rate of the Renminbi. Post 2005 
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CHAPTER 3- RENMINBI'S EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATE AND ITS ALLEGED 
UNDERVALUATION 
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The historical account going back to the late 1970s summarized in the last chapter 
give us insights into Chinese policymakers' mentality behind managing the country's rigid 
exchange rate regime in the economic reform and opening-up era. The trends of the 
nominal RMB-USD bilateral exchange rate since the start of the reform 30 plus years ago, 
especially prior to the July 2005 exchange rate reform, indicate the nominal renminbi 
exchange rate has been heavily-manipulated by the Chinese authorities to implement an 
export-led growth strategy. Over the past few years, monetary authorities in China have 
been set against any dramatic changes in their currency regime due in large part to 
apprehension that a sharp renminbi appreciation would seriously destabilize the country's 
current export-led growth trajectory. As a result, the renminbi has been kept from 
appreciating by massive intervention in the international exchange market. Such 
intervention in tandem with China's sustained high export growth and a burgeoning 
current account surplus hitting a peak of 11 percent of GOP in 2007 (Batson, 2010), 
indicates an undervalued renminbi and that "[the] appreciation of the renminbi that has 
taken place to date against the U.S. dollar is completely inadequate to make a real dent in 
China's huge current account surplus" (Goldstein, 2007, p.2). 
Using different measurement approaches such as the Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP), Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER), and the Fundamental Equilibrium 
Exchange Rate (FEER), a good number of empirical studies have been undertaken to 
examine whether accusations of an undervalued renminbi can hold. However, by how 
much the renminbi is undervalued was, and continues to be, an area of complete 
disagreement in international monetary economics. This, according to Das (2009, p.574) is 
partly due to the fact that "which [methodology] is appropriate for the purpose of sizing up 
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the undervaluation of the [renminbi] has remained an unresolved issue until the present 
time." 
The first approach to identify the renminbi's equilibrium exchange rate is, according 
to William Cline and John Williamson (2007, p.3), "to find the exchange rate that would 
lead to purchasing power parity (PPP)." The PPP approach is perhaps one of the earliest 
approaches to determining the equilibrium exchange rates. It provides the long-run 
framework for the monetary and portfolio approaches to exchange rate determination. 
However, economists such as Cline and Williamson (2007) are skeptical of the PPP 
approach in general and its application to China in particular. "One major limitation of the 
approach," according to Cline and Williamson (2007, p.4), "is that by definition it means the 
United States can never be over- or undervalued: the United States is the numeraire for PPP 
exchange rate equal to market rate. This is a gaping hole for an analytical approach, 
considering that the US current account deficit currently absorbs the vast bulk of combined 
surpluses of the rest of the world." According to the Big Max index of The Economist, which 
falls squarely into the PPP category, the value of the renminbi to the dollar was 58 percent 
undervalued in 2007 (The Economist, 2007a). However, according to another analogous 
index called the "Starbucks talllatte index", the renminbi was only 1 percent undervalued 
in 2004 (Das, 2009). 
The second approach is the BEER developed by Peter Clark and Ronald MacDonald 
(1999). According to Cline and Williamson (2007, p.6), "A [BEER] aims to estimate the 
index level to which the market exchange rate might be expected to revert in the medium 
or long run, given an absence of shocks." Unlike PPP, which deals in direct price 
comparisons for internationally comparable baskets of goods, and in a similar fashion than 
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the FEER (which will be discussed later), the BEER explains the real exchange rate behavior 
in terms of economic fundamentals using reduced-form econometric equations. It focuses 
on the real exchange rate and the medium-term equilibrium rates of the fundamental 
determinants (i.e. internal and external balance proxies). In particular, the BEER approach 
can capture the sources of changes in capital accounts as well as other factors affecting the 
behavior of the REER. In fact, according to Clark and MacDonald (2000), exchange rate 
misalignments resulting from the BEER approach at any point in time can be decomposed 
into the effect of transitory factors, random disturbances and the extent to which the 
economic fundamentals are away from their sustainable values. 
BEER models in China have generally produced much lower estimates of the 
renminbi. Studies such as Wang (2004) reported that the renminbi's value to the dollar was 
only about 5 percent undervalued in 2003 according to the BEER approach, and Funke and 
Rahn (2005) estimated that the renminbi was undervalued by about 3 percent at the end of 
2002. A problem with some BEER estimates, according to Cline and Williamson (2007, p.6), 
"is that they are calculated from a regression for a single country rather than from cross-
country experience. Such studies are surely incapable of examining whether a country's 
policy intervention is or is not making the country over- or undervalued." 
The third yet the most widely employed approach is the FEER, or the 
macroeconomic balance concept of equilibrium (Das, 2009), introduced into academic 
analysis by John Williamson in 1983. The FEER, which is expected to simultaneously 
achieve internal and external balance-that is, output growth at its potential level and a 
sustainable current account position, is the most important and relevant approach to date 
for economists and policymakers to compute the degree of renminbi undervaluation given 
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China's extraordinarily large current account surplus in recent years. It, expounds Das 
(2009), is a "rational approach" that tries to answer the question of what level of real 
effective, and therefore trade-weighted, exchange rate would generate a current account 
surplus or deficit equal to the underlying capital flows over the business cycle, assuming 
that the economy is pursing internal balance, which implies full non-inflationary 
employment. 
Methodologically, the FEER is the most preferred approach by economists and 
policymakers alike. This, according to Cline and Williamson (2007, p.4), is "because the 
necessary assumption of average equilibrium over the estimation period makes even the 
internationally-based BEER approach less reliable." Furthermore, because of its underlying 
fragility and likely bias in Chinese price comparison estimates, the estimates arrived at by 
the PPP approach are also considered to be unreliable (Cline & Williamson, 2007). We will 
thus discuss the FEER approach in more detail. One of the studies in the FEER school is by 
Vanessa Rossi (2005) who estimated that the exchange rate of the renminbi was close to 
equilibrium in 2000-2001. Projecting from these results, Rossi (2005) predicted that in 
2010 the undervaluation of the renminbi against the U.S. dollar would be in the range of 
5.5-7 percent. Also using the FEER model, Cline (2007) estimated the needed remaining 
appreciation of the renminbi to be in a range of 11 to 18 percent from its 2006 level in real 
effective terms and 34 to 39 percent against the dollar. 
Why are there large variations in estimates arrived at based on the FEER 
methodology alone? According to Cline and Williamson (2007), the major source of 
discrepancies among the FEER estimates is the studies' assumptions about how much of 
China's current account surplus is strictly cyclical and transitory, thereby how large a 
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change in the current account of the balance of payments should be targeted. After that 
come different assumptions about the price elasticities of demand, including assumptions 
about the import content of exports, a step that turns out to be critical for calculating how 
much the exchange rate would need to move to close the gap between the cyclically 
adjusted actual and target current account balances. 
On the former issue, the biggest surplus reduction target-which is rationalized by 
China's high saving propensity-is one of Tao Wang (2004)'s estimates. Wang (2004) 
argues that it is in China's national interest to save in excess of the level of investment that 
is efficient at the world interest rate and export the resulting savings as a current account 
surplus. In other words, China should aim for a larger current account surplus because it 
has a high saving rate. However, as Cline and Williamson (2007) point out, in Wang 
(2004)'s exercises phenomena such as China's high saving rate are not calculated to 
maximize social welfare of the Chinese citizens, since there are still about a hundred 
million social underclass in China who save a large portion of their incomes partly because 
much of the saving is corporate and is not their decision at all, and partly because they are 
afraid of the future due to the lack of a social safety net. If one holds such a view, then a 
current account not enormously different from balance-similar to the objectives of most 
of the FEER exercises-seems to be a more natural and reasonable target. Consequently, 
Cline and Williamson (2007) consider the Wang (2004) calculations-which estimate 
China's cyclically adjusted current account surplus to be around 2 percent of GOP-
seriously understated. Excluding these estimates, the average for the FEER estimates 
summarized by Cline and Williamson (2007) is a needed renminbi appreciation of 27 
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percent in real effective terms and 36 percent in the renminbi-U.S. dollar bilateral exchange 
rate. 
On the latter issue, one study that investigates the impact of variations in trade 
elasticities is that of Steven Dunaway, Lamin Leigh, and Xiangming Li (2006). Their 
estimates of the impact of increased export and import elasticities from 1 to 1.5 are 
interdependent with those of the current account adjustment to be accomplished: If this is 
only 1 percent of GDP, lower elasticities would increase the alleged renminbi 
undervaluation by about 4 percent, whereas with a gap of 3 percent of GDP, the impact on 
the undervaluation would be about 13 percent (Cline & Williamson, 2007). The difference 
is substantial. However, as Cline and Williamson (2007) point out, even after accounting for 
the relatively large share of imported intermediates used to produce exports, China's 
current account balance should be expected to show relatively high response to the 
renminbi's REER in light of its large share of trade in GDP. 
So far we have seen that, despite enormous efforts, different econometric exercises 
based on different measures have come up with extensively varying estimates of the extent 
of undervaluation of the renminbi- ranging from 0 to close to 50 percent. Nevertheless, 
the average estimates of 18 studies summarized by Cline and Williamson (2007) indicate 
substantial undervaluation of the renminbi. "The simple average of the 14 estimates of the 
correction needed in the real effective exchange rate [of the renminbi] is a 19 percent 
appreciation; the corresponding simple average of the 16 estimates of the bilateral rate 
against the U.S. dollar is an appreciation of 40 percentS" (Cline & Williamson, 2007, p.131-
s "The extreme Big Mac estimate of 138 percent needed appreciation is omitted from this average because the 
'simple' PPP approach is widely regarded as inappropriate" (Cline & Williamson, 2007, p.132). 
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132). The 2006 Article IV consultation report of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(IMF, 2006) also took this position. For example, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the managing 
director of the IMF, took a swipe at the renminbi in early 2009 and declared it "significantly 
undervalued," emphasizing the official position of the IMF (Das, 2008). 
CHAPTER 4- CHINA'S EXTRAORDINARILY LARGE CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS AND ITS 
DETERMINANTS 
4.1 The Upsurge in China's Current Account Surplus in Recent Years 
Politicians in the United States and Western Europe often criticize China's rigid 
exchange rate regime. Their real concern, however, is probably not China's exchange rate 
policy per se, but its large and growing current account surplus-the broadest measure of 
net export. It was argued that, by artificially depressing the value of the renminbi, China 
took jobs away from its trading partners. It was also argued that the resulting global 
imbalances were a cause of the recent global financial crisis. Despite the fact that China's 
current account surplus moderated slightly in 2008 and 2009 following the global financial 
crisis 6-as its external demand was seriously dampened, the country continues to display 
the world's largest current account surplus in absolute dollar terms (Krugman, 2010). 
According to Yiping Huang and Kunyu Tao (2010), the rapid expansion of China's current 
account surplus is, in fact, a relatively recent phenomenon with the sharpest rise occurring 
after 2004. Within three years, the surplus jumped from USD$68.7 billion (3.6 percent of 
GDP) in 2004 to its recent peak ofUSD$371.8 billion (10.8 percent ofGDP) in 2007. Bottom 
line is that a surplus of this magnitude relative to GOP is "unprecedented for a country of 
6 According to China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange, the country's current account surplus 
accounted for 9.9 percent ofGDP in 2008, compared with 5.8 percent in 2009. 
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China's size and stage of development" (McGregor, 2007, p.1). Figure 4.1 plots China's 
current account position as percent of GOP for the period 1982 to 2008. 
Figure 4.1 China "s Current Account Posit ion (% GDP), 1985-2009 
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How does one account for an almost tripling of the current account surplus as a 
share of the Chinese GOP, from 3.6 percent in 2004 to close to 11 percent in 2007? What is 
the root cause of the problem? According to Huang and Tao (2010), there is a long list of 
competing explanations that may be helpful for understanding China's growing external 
imbalance problem. These explanations may be broadly grouped into four categories: (1) 
capital-intensive, industry-led growth with high domestic savings and investment; (2) total 
factor productivity improvements; (3) factor market distortions; and ( 4) exchange rate 
distortion and policies supporting export growth. It should be noted that these 
explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, the perceived exchange 
rate distortion might be applied as a part of the general policies supporting export growth 
(Corden, 2009). The upshot is that China's growing current account surplus is a by-product 
of the distinct features of China's pattern of growth over the past decades and a variety of 
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policies that are behind it, including, of course-perhaps crucially-its exchange rate 
policy. 
4.2 Capital-Intensive, Industry-Led Growth with High Domestic Savings and Investment? 
We will now analysing each explanation in turn. First, since the current account 
surplus is, by definition, the surplus of savings over investment, some economists8 sought 
to explain China's large current account surplus by examining the structural factors behind 
its saving and investment behavior. They argue that China's traditionally high household 
saving rates have risen further in recent years due to the increasing need to provide for 
healthcare, basic education, employment insurance and pension, given the lack of sufficient 
public provision of these services for the bulk of the population resulting from the 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises starting in the mid-1990s. In addition, investment 
rose with savings, but less rapidly. For example, from 2000 to 2006, saving outpaced 
investment even as the investment to GOP ratio increased by 10 percentage points during 
that period (He & Kuijs, 2007). Due in part to the widening of the domestic savings-
investment gap during this period, China's external imbalance has thus boomed-as 
reflected in the sharp rise of current account surplus from 1. 7 percent of GOP in 2000 to an 
estimated 9 percent of GOP in 2006 (He & Kuijs, 2007). It is further argued that the 
increasing share of household savings in GOP has been matched by a rapid decrease in that 
of consumption. Although domestic consumption has grown rapidly in China for many 
years, it has lagged behind the overall growth rate of the economy. 
7 According to Jianwu He and Louis Kuijs (2007), FDI has played an important role in China's development, in 
particular in transferring foreign technology. However, at 3-4 percent of GOP, FDI has not been a key source 
of financing. Indeed, as in most countries, domestic saving has been the key source of financing. 
8 For example, Feenstra, Hai, Woo and Yao (1999) 
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However, contrary to popular thinking, household savings has not been the main 
driving force behind the impressive increase in China's domestic savings in recent years. 
According to Huang and Tao (2010), Chinese household savings as a share of GDP have, in 
fact, been very stable over the past decade, fluctuating slightly around 20 percent. This rate 
is certainly high compared to those in the OECD countries, but no higher than that of other 
rapidly growing East Asian ones (Huang & Tao, 2010). In fact, owing partially to low 
wages 9 and absence of payments of taxes or dividends to the government, much of China's 
high savings is done by corporations whose profits and thus savings have been 
experiencing a persistent increase in recent years (Carden, 2009). Corporate savings in 
China, according to the Bank of China governor Zhou Xiaochuan, were about 22.9 percent of 
GDP in 2007, roughly doubling their share in 1992 (Zhou, 2009). Thus, rising corporate 
savings has probably been the key factor of China's large and growing current account 
surplus in recent years. Zhou (2009) also suggested that, given its unique income 
distribution pattern, China should increase the investment rate, in addition to lowering the 
saving rate, in order to reduce its current account surplus. The only problem, however, is 
that China's investment has already risen very rapidly in recent years, both in terms of level 
and as a share of GDP. 1o According to Huang and Tao (2010), investment has in fact become 
the single most important driver of China's overall growth, accounting for almost 50 
percent of real GDP growth in 2010. Consequently, China probably has limited room now to 
further raise the investment rate. 
9 Notwithstanding reported increases in average urban wages, unskilled worker wages have not increased 
much because of continuous massive labor inflows from the rural economy to urban centers (Corden, 2009). 
1° From around 35 percent in 1995 to 44 percent in 2006-a record high by regional standards and a level 
comparable to that in several other East Asian economies prior to the 1997-98 crisis (Cappiello & Ferrucci, 
2008). 
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As Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008) point out, high investment shares of GOP are not 
uncommon for catching-up economies like China that need comparatively faster capital 
accumulation to keep the capital stock constant as a share of GOP. In principle, rapid 
investment growth may result from a rational response by the corporate sector to 
expectations of future demand growth in sectors that are doing well at present. By the 
same token, since industry is more capital intensive than other sectors, it requires a lot of 
investment both to offset depreciation and to expand capacity (He & Kuijs, 2007). As 
corporate profitability has remained broadly sound in China over the past few years, much 
of the country's industrial investment can be financed through retained earnings of 
profitable firms (which are counted as corporate savings). Another part of the correlation 
between investment and industry runs via government investment. According to Jianwu He 
and Louis Kuijs (2007, p.7), "In fast industrializing countries like China, heavy investment 
in infrastructure supports industrialization ... The infrastructure pays off in terms of more 
growth and, indirectly, more government revenues." That is why the high government 
investment in infrastructure will continue to be part of the pattern of growth in China. 
Furthermore, according to Prasad (2007), growth accounting analyses suggest that 
investment in physical capital has been a major contributor to China's growth during the 
past decade, in some recent years accounting for nearly two-thirds of nominal GOP growth. 
Gross fixed capital formation in factories, buildings, infrastructure, etc. has, in fact, always 
been high in China, but it increased even further from 35 percent of GOP in 2000 to an 
estimated 45 percent of GOP in 2006 (Prasad, 2007). This was combined with a rise in 
gross domestic savings from 37 percent of GOP in 2000 to an estimated 51 percent in 
2006-one of the highest shares among economies of comparable size and level of 
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development, according to He and Kuijs (2007). Private consumption, by contrast, has 
made a much smaller contribution to China's growth during the same period. Thus, one 
distinct feature of China's growth pattern is that it is increasingly capital-intensive and 
industry-led, with high and increasing domestic savings and investment. Such growth 
pattern has certainly served the Chinese economy well in many respects. But, as Prasad 
(2007) points out, one consequence of this investment-heavy expansion has been relatively 
slow employment growth. 11 Moreover, "[w]hile factor accumulation is a time-honored path 
to higher growth for many developing countries, whether such a high level of savings 
intermediated mainly through an inefficient banking system can produce long-lasting 
welfare gains is dubious" (Prasad & Rajan, 2006, p.6). 
4.3 Total Factor Productivity Improvements 
Another important explanation for the sharp rise in the current account surplus in 
recent years is that the Chinese economy underwent a strong, positive productivity shock 
which made Chinese exports far more competitive in international markets than they have 
ever been. According to Bert Hofman and Louis Kuijs (2007), an important feature of 
China's growth is that much of the GOP growth has come from rapid growth of industrial 
production 12-much of it in the form of higher labor productivity. To a large extent, this is 
due to an earlier investment boom in physical capital and hence, increased capital-labor 
ratio. For example, "[i]n recent years the contribution of capital accumulation to labor 
productivity growth increased from 3.3 out of 7 percent per year in 1978-1993 to 5.3 out of 
8.4 percent in 1993-2005, a very high figure compared with other countries" (He & Kuijs, 
11 For example, from 2000 to 2005, growth of total non-agricultural employment averaged only 3 percent per 
annum compared with average non-agricultural GOP growth of about 9.5 percent (Prasad, 2008). 
12 "In 2003-06, industry contributed 60 percent of total GOP growth in China, compared with 6 percent by 
agriculture and 34 percent by the services sector" (Hofman & Kuijs, 2007). 
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2007, p.3). Thus, contrary to popular thinking, total factor productivity has not been low in 
China, and high capital accumulation explains the bulk of the difference in labor 
productivity growth between China and other countries or regions. 
As Goldstein and Lardy (2008, p.12) points out, "Despite a 9 percent appreciation of 
the renminbi vis-a-vis the US dollar between June 2005 and August 2007, the price of 
Chinese goods imported into the United States was basically unchanged." 13 Since profit 
margins in China's export industry have increased (World Bank, 2007) rather than 
decreased, "[the] most likely explanation is that productivity growth in those industries 
exporting to the United States was sufficiently large that firms could more than absorb the 
adverse effect of the rising value of the renminbi on their earnings" (Goldstein & Lardy, 
2008, p.23). Goldstein and Lardy (2008) continue to argue that the combination of a 
nominal appreciation of the renminbi vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar of about 9 percent and 
unchanged price of Chinese imports in the United States suggest that total factor 
productivity growth in China's export industries was about 9 percent between June 2005 
and August 2007. Gang Fan, another economist with CASS, is one of many China experts 
who express support for Goldstein and Lardy's "hidden productivity thesis." Specifically, 
Fan (2007) points out that rapid productivity growth helps explain why profitability in 
Chinese corporations has recently been high, and why import substitution has been a 
prominent feature of China's recent net export surge. Thus, total factor productivity 
improvements in China's export industry are a convincing explanation for China's rising 
current account surplus in recent years. 
13 According to Goldstein and Lardy (2008, p.l2), "Prices of Chinese imports in August 2007 were 0.2 percent 
less than in June 2005. These estimates are not based on unit values of imports but take into account the 
changing composition and quality of imported goods." 
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4.4 Factor Market Distortions 
Yet another explanation about China's growing current account surplus is factor 
market distortions-which are also considered to be part of the Chinese government's 
broad policy measures to support its export-led growth model. The hypothesis is that during 
China's economic reform period, while the government focused on reform of the product 
markets, including abandoning policy interventions in domestic markets and liberalizing 
trade, it has, in contrast, adopted measures distorting prices of almost all factors including 
labor, land, energy and the natural environment in order to achieve rapid export growth. 
These factor market distortions have indeed exerted more upward pressures on China's 
already large current account surplus by lifting producers' profitability, investors' returns, 
and hence the international competitiveness of Chinese exports to even higher levels. 
According to Huang and Tao (2010), estimated factor market distortions, in fact, provide 
"good fits" of China's external sector surplus which rose after 2004 but peaked in 2006 at 
12.2 percent ofGDP. 
a) Distortions in the Labor Market 
China's labor market has become highly distorted over the past decade or so. China 
is well-known for its abundant and cheap labor. This was a key factor behind China's 
success in labor-intensive manufacturing exports. According to Huang and Tao (2010), 
labor costs in China may be distorted for two interrelated reasons: segmentation of rural 
and urban labor markets and under development of social welfare systems. Labor market 
segmentation in China was largely a result of the household registration system (HRS) 
introduced in the pre-reform era. Although the HRS has not prevented much migration in 
China recently, evidenced by the largest migration in human history with nearly 150 
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million people on the move by early 2011 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011), it 
conditions the terms on which migrant workers from rural areas have been able to obtain 
work and basic social services in urban areas, and thus erects important barriers for labor 
mobility in China. 
According to James Lee (2009, p.1), more than half of China's population lives in 
rural areas, and "as a legacy of past economic and pension policies, there is great disparity 
in both economic development and pension coverage between the urban and rural 
populations." While the urban population is generally better covered, the rural populations 
sit outside the scope of any pension coverage. Indeed the pension system and reform 
process in China have thus far largely ignored the rural sector. According to the World 
Bank (2009), China's pension system covered just 15 percent of the population as of March 
2008. Moreover, "alongside the transition from collectivized agriculture, households in 
rural China also faced increasing integration with the broader Chinese economy, as well as 
international markets" (Benjamin et al., 2005, p.9). The HRS which limited the movement of 
people out of agriculture and the rural areas where productivity and income are much 
lower14 has also generated changing terms of trade between agricultural and non-
agricultural products over the period of the reform, especially in the latter half of the 
1990s. As a result, agricultural prices in China declined in relation to non-agricultural 
prices (He & Kuijs, 2007). This not only reduces production costs in urban manufacturing 
industries by lowering both input and labor costs-which further improves exporters' 
profitability and accentuates China's already large external surplus, it is also an important 
14 According to He and Kuijs (2007), productivity in agriculture is about 1/61h of that in the rest of the Chinese 
economy, compared to a global average ratio of 1/3. 
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reason behind the increase in rural-urban income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient. 
Furthermore, during the last decade and a half, pushed by insufficient employment 
opportunities in rural areas and their abundant labor resources, and pulled by the fast-
growing manufacturing industries and the relatively high standard of living in urban areas, 
China has witnessed a domestic migration of workers from rural to urban areas on an 
unprecedented scale. This has resulted in the emergence of a large urban "underclass" who, 
lacking local or urban household registration, cannot access any of the basic social welfare 
benefits urban residents are entitled to, such as medical insurance, pension coverage, 
unemployment support and compulsory 9-year basic education, even if they have been 
working in cities for years. On the one hand, the large increase in the number of non-
contract based, migrant workers in China's urban labor market has undoubtedly facilitated 
the efficient allocation of labor in accordance with market demand and supply; on the other 
hand, it poses a serious challenge for the development and enforcement of regulations that 
can offer adequate protection to those workers who now face new forms of social 
insecurity. According to Huang and Tao (2010, p.15), "Should urban employers make social 
welfare contributions for their migrant workers, their payrolls could rise by about 35 to 50 
percent, which includes contribution to pension (20 percent of payroll), medical insurance 
(6 percent), unemployment benefit (2 percent), working injury insurance (1 percent), 
maternity benefits (0.8 percent) and housing entitlement (5-10 percent)." Thus, social 
welfare contribution is the most important area of distortion or underpay in China's labor 
market. 
b) Distortions in the Markets for Land, Energy, and Primary Commodities 
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Over the past decade or so, also due in part to the Chinese government's deliberate 
policy measures to support export-led growth, the markets for land, energy, and primary 
commodities have also become highly distorted. These distortions which have put 
increasing strains on the environment, generally push factor prices and, therefore, 
production costs below levels otherwise would be in market environment. 
First, according to Huang and Tao (2010, p.16), "land [in China] is owned by the 
state in the cities and by the collectives in the countryside." However, since the start of the 
economic reform, especially over the past 20 years or so, local governments have been 
selling user rights of land to private investors and property developers on an 
unprecedented scale. According to official (National Bureau of Statistics of China) Chinese 
data, investment by the private sector in fixed assets such as factory buildings and 
machinery grew nearly threefold between 2000 and 2005. In addition, the private share of 
total fixed-assets investment which includes investments by collective enterprises (many 
of which are private) has risen from 42 percent to 60 percent during the same period (The 
Economist, 2007b ). However, since for a long time there had not been any market 
mechanism for determining land prices for industrial use in China, they were often set by 
the local governments at artificially low levels through under-the -table negotiations in 
order to attract investment and promote growth. Local governments sometimes even 
compete with each other in offering preferential policies to attract investment. For 
example, "[i]n recent years, the average fees collected from negotiated granting of land use 
rights were only about 16 percent of those collected through auctions" (Huang and Tao, 
2010, p.16). Furthermore, according to The Economist (2007b), since most of the land 
appropriated for housing and factory construction has been farmland in rural areas, it has 
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rendered millions of farmers landless. In fact, many of the land owners in China have been 
given little or no compensation for their land loss. This probably explains why property 
and land disputes have become a leading cause of social unrest in China in recent years 
(The Economist, 2007b). 
Next, because China's export-led growth has been particularly intensive in energy, 
primary commodities, and other natural resources, its overall reliance on these inputs is 
high. For example, according to He and Kuijs (2007), in 2007 China used 4.5 times as much 
energy per US dollar of output as the United States (at market exchange rates), and 7.5 
times as much as in Japan. Also in 2007, China consumed more than 30 percent of the 
world total consumption of coal, steel, tin and cement (Streifel, 2007). However, as Huang 
and Tao (2010) expound, when international prices of key energy products such as oil, gas, 
and coal moved violently upward, the Chinese government were reluctant to follow for fear 
of disrupting economic growth. For instance, when international crude oil prices reached 
their recent peak, at close to $150 per barrel in 2008, the equivalent domestic prices were 
only around $80 per barrel in China (Huang & Tao, 2010). With the acceleration of industry 
growth and as the markets for land, energy, and primary commodities become increasingly 
distorted, emission and pollution are another problem facing China today. 
According to He and Kuijs (2007), after a long period of declining nitrous oxide 
(NOx) and sulphur dioxide (S02) emission, they rose again since 2003. "With 16 of the 20 
cities with the worst air pollution in the world are in China, the country has become the 
largest source of S02 emission in the world and may soon become the largest emitter of 
carbon dioxide (C02); some say the country already is" (He & Kuijs, 2007, p.10). Today, 
poor air quality is still a very visible issue in China, and costly, especially in large cities. A 
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recent study done by the World Bank (2007) estimates that the health costs of air pollution 
amounted to about 3.8 percent of the Chinese GOP in 2007. In addition, according to 
Hofman and Kuijs (2007), one-third of China's landmass regularly experiences acid rain, 
causing an estimated environmental damage of some $13 billion U.S. dollar, or 1 percent of 
China's (2003) GOP per year. "Since producers do not always fully compensate their 
damages to the environment, it reduces the short-term production costs, at the expense of 
long-term development of the whole economy and society" (Huang & Tao, 2010, p.17). 
Thus, despite China's remarkable economic progress, it still has a long way to go to make 
its growth more environmentally sustainable. 
4.5 Exchange Rate Distortion and Policies Promoting Export Growths 
Finally, we move to the central question and the most reasonable explanation for 
the surge in China's current account surplus in recent years, at least on the surface. In the 
view that exchange rate distortion and policies supporting export have played a crucial role 
in boosting China's current account surplus, an increasingly undervalued renminbi under 
China's current rigid exchange rate regime raises the country's export and depresses its 
imports, and thus inflates its current account surplus. The common argument, which has 
been most frequently referenced in public debate about China's external imbalances, is that 
if the renminbi were allowed to float, it would appreciate substantially more, and this 
would reduce China's high current account surplus. 
According to Goldstein (2007), despite an appreciation of the renminbi against the 
U.S. dollar since June 2005, the REER of the renminbi-widely regarded as a more 
comprehensive and superior measure of the overall competitiveness of Chinese exports-
had actually depreciated since the dollar peak in February 2002. The depreciation ranges 
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from 2 to 11 percent, depending on the measure chosen (Goldstein, 2007). Figure 4.2 
displays China's REER from 1994Q1 to 2008Q2. According to Lardy (2007), usually, 
external payment adjustments call for appreciation of the REERs of the domestic 
currencies, that is, for declines in external competitiveness in countries with large current 
account or trade surpluses. In the case of China, however, the REER of the renminbi has 
moved in a direction opposite to what is needed. Lardy (2007) continues to argue that even 
indicators of the REER understate the improvement in China's competitive position in 
global trade because "the price indices used to construct them include some non-tradable 
goods and hence do not give adequate weight to rapid productivity growth in China's 
export industries. 
Figure 4.2 China 's Real Effective Exchange Rate, 1994Ql-2008Q2 
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Goldstein and Lardy (2006) applied the "underlying balance" approach to evaluate 
the misalignment of the renminbi. As discussed in Chapter 3, the essence of their approach 
was to calculate the needed adjustments in the renminbi's REER in order to retain a 
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"normal" current account balance. They concluded that resisting underlying pressures for 
REER appreciation-coming partially from China's high productivity growth in its traded 
goods sector relative to that of its trading partners-had contributed to growing trade 
surplus and, at least in some years, had fed very large portfolio capital inflows, which 
appeared motivated by an expectation of renminbi appreciation. Furthermore, applying 
data for the period of 1994 to 2003, Xiangqian Lu and Guoqiang Dai (2005) examined the 
long-run relationship between China's international trade and the renminbi's REER. 
Results of their co-integrated vector auto regression (VAR) model suggested that the 
renminbi's REER had significant impacts on China's exports and imports. These results 
confirm the fact that the renminbi's REER has indeed been an important determinant of 
China's anomalous current account imbalance in recent years (Huang & Tao, 2010). 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the maintenance of a rigid exchange rate 
regime since at least the mid-1990s is only part of China's export-led growth strategy, and 
that by the same token, the country's large external surplus is a by-product of policies 
supporting export growth. 
Yu Yongding, another prominent economist with CASS, identified China's export-
promotion policy, which includes the so-called "self-balancing" regulation, exchange rate 
policy and tax rebate, as another contributing factor to China's current account surplus in 
recent years. According to Yu (2007), the Chinese authorities demanded foreign investors 
to guarantee the "self-balancing" of foreign exchange for important investment projects. In 
other words, FDI in China must be export-oriented. This is evidenced by the fact that all the 
multinational corporations are now in China, and all of them aim to export to the 
international market. In 2009, for example, 60 percent of China's export is actually from 
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multinational corporations, either joint ventures or foreign investment companies (Corden, 
2009). This, as concurred by Corden (2009), is another fundamental reason for China's 
growing current account surplus in recent years. 
Yet there have also been other factors. As is pointed out by Prema-chandra 
Athukorala (2009), China's accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 
significantly improved the attractiveness of its domestic investment climate for export-
oriented production. Consequently, the process of relocation to China, from Japan, Taiwai 
and Korea especially, of final assembly activities of information and communication 
technology products accelerated. In addition, according to Corden (2009), WTO accession 
contributed significantly to improve investor confidence in the Chinese economy, and this 
might also be regarded as a productivity improvement in the export sector. Although this 
showed up in China's current account balance with a time lag (Corden, 2009), the overall 
picture is that China's export growth intensified following its WTO accession. 
The Chinese authorities' policy bias in favor of strong, export-led growth is well 
known. In fact, a significant part of China's growth stems from increasing production of 
manufactured goods. According to Hofman and Kuijs (2007), while aggregate demand and 
supply in China's economy are growing broadly in line with each other, a large share of the 
demand is coming from abroad, instead of Chinese households and businesses. Under the 
investment-heavy, export-oriented pattern of growth, and with surplus labor in agriculture 
keeping wage growth below productivity gains, production in China increasingly outstrips 
domestic demand (Hofman & Kuijs, 2007). Thus, from an external perspective, accelerating 
manufacturing production means continued strong export expansion. 
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Also according to Huang and Tao (2010), over the past few years China has chosen 
to boost manufacturing production at whatever costs. One prosaic explanation is that China 
still has huge surplus labor in the countryside, and at the same time does not have well-
developed social welfare system. Thus, a key challenge facing the government is job 
creation. The widely accepted 8 percent growth target, for instance, was formulated based 
on employment pressure (Huang & Tao, 2010). Another policy orientation, according to 
Huang and Tao (2010), is to maintain stability on the domestic and external fronts while 
opening up to trade and financial flows, especially after the Asian financial crisis in 1997-
98. In this context, the buildup of foreign exchange reserves resulting from these policies 
may serve as a form of self-insurance against vulnerabilities arising from the country's 
weak baking system. However, as Eswar Prasad and Raghuram Rajan (2006, p.S) point out, 
there comes a point when the policy distortions-especially exchange rate distortion-
needed to maintain this approach "could generate imbalances, impose potentially large 
welfare costs, and themselves become a source of instability." 
In fact, at least since 2006 China's foreign exchange reserves have been well above 
the level that seemed to be required (Carden, 2009). Consequently, the Chinese authorities 
have made improving quality of growth a top policy priority (see, for example, Wen 2006). 
Albeit exchange rate policy-as reflected in the reluctance to let the renminbi appreciate in 
line with China's development progress-has just been one part of the story, it can and 
does affect the country's external surplus. Does it really matter anyway? As Jonathan 
Anderson (2008, p.66) points out, "Whatever the driving force, the fact that China has seen 
a high and sharply rising current account surplus over the past few years clearly means 
that the renminbi is undervalued in a near-term, workaday sense." Consequently, if the 
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Chinese authorities were really hoping to reduce the country's external surplus, a more 
flexible exchange rate regime that would bring about significant real appreciation of the 
renminbi could definitely be part of the policy prescription. 
CHAPTER 5- CONUNDRUMS FACING THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES UNDER THE CURRENT 
EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
5.1 Monetary Policy Independence 
As China undergoes market reforms and integrates into the world economy, 
monetary policy is a crucial means through which the Chinese authorities manage the 
country's complex and rapidly changing economic situation. Because monetary policy 
carries with it system-wide implications for the Chinese economy, even at the 
microeconomic level, the flexibility and effectiveness of monetary policy are of particular 
importance under China's unique circumstances. More specifically, according to the Deputy 
Governor of the PBOC Hu Xiaolian, "[m]onetary policy in China helps achieve various 
objectives, including managing inflation, supporting growth, promoting a balanced BOP 
account, boosting employment and facilitating financial reform" (Hu, 2010, p.1). However, 
over the last decade or so, China's rigid exchange rate regime has imposed a substantial 
constraint on the conduct of its monetary policy and the impact is likely to continue 
(Goldstein & Lardy, 2006; Lardy, 2006; Prasad et al., 2005). 
According to Hu (2010), prior to 1993, China ran surpluses in the current account 
and in the capital account-the two principal divisions of the balance of payments (BOP)-
on an alternate basis. The situation changed in 1994 when China began to run "twin 
surpluses" of its BOP (a large and growing current account surplus compounded by a 
surplus in the capital account), and intensified following China's accession to the WTO in 
2001. For example, China recorded a current account surplus of USD$250 billion in 2006 
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(9.3 percent of GOP), on top of which net financial inflows 15 contributed to increase further 
the country's overall BOP surplus (Cappiello & Ferrucci, 2008). 
Normally, a large expansion of BOP surplus would lead to appreciation pressures on 
the domestic currency, which in turn would lead to deterioration in the country's 
competitive position in international trade. This can happen even with little flexibility in its 
exchange rate regime. However, resisting pressures for renminbi appreciation, the PBOC 
intervenes massively in the foreign exchange market by purchasing a large amount of 
foreign exchange-to the tune of about US0$20 billion a month in 2006 and US0$45 billion 
a month in the first quarter of 2007 (Goldstein, 2007). According to Goldstein (2007, p.7), 
in each of the past three years from 2007, "China's exchange market intervention has 
amounted to roughly 10 percent of its GOP-a truly extraordinary amount." The renminbi 
equivalent of foreign exchange purchases has in turn fueled a surge in the supply of base 
money, and generates a "liquidity overhang" in the banking and financial system. Such 
liquidity overhang has in turn led to inflation in the Chinese economy. For example, the 
inflation rate in China was last reported at 5.3 percent in April 2011, compared to an 
average of 4.25 percent over the 1994-2010 period (PBOC, 2011). 16 Moreover, in a recent 
Chinese article, CASS economist Qiyuan Xu (2010) points out that the official CPI data has 
been "systematically under-reported by the government" since his research found that over 
7 percent of price increases in the Chinese economy could not be explained by the 
subcategories and their assigned weight for the past 5 years or so. 
15 According to Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008), net FDI inflows in China averaged nearly 5 percent of GOP 
annually in the five years prior to the Asian financial crisis. They have fallen since then, but were still US0$61 
billion in 2006 (2.3 percent of GOP). Other capital flows-probably mostly speculative in nature-grew 
significantly in 2004 (to US0$91 billion) but were negative in the following two years. 
16 Source: PBOC Statistics for 2011 and author's own calculations. 
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Under the current situation, relatively high domestic interest rates would be needed 
to cool down China's "overheated" economy and to rein in inflation. However, the paradox 
is that higher domestic interest rates in relation to foreign rates would attract higher levels 
of speculative capital inflows, which would put even higher upward pressures on the 
renminbi exchange rate. Furthermore, as Goldstein and Lardy (2009) point out, "[c]apital 
controls, in theory, could prevent large inflows [of international capital] when domestic 
interest rates are higher than foreign rates, but in practice it is difficult to maintain 
effective controls over time, particularly in an economy [like China] that is very open to 
trade." 
In fact, as Robert Mundell (2004) points out, the serious challenges faced by China's 
monetary policies are those implied by the "impossible trinity" hypothesis which 
postulates that in an integrated world economy, it is impossible for a country to achieve 
simultaneously exchange rate stability, monetary independence, and free international 
movement of capital. So far, however, it appears that it has been possible for the Chinese 
authorities to keep the renminbi exchange rate relatively stable without overriding 
domestic monetary policy. 
This, according to Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008), is achieved by "imposing tight 
controls on the capital account and by maintaining close restrictions on the cross-border 
movement of capital... [which] has allowed a certain degree of monetary autonomy to be 
retained through the use of administrative measure, such as increase in the reserve 
requirement ratio on bank deposits and the so-called 'window guidance' policy, which aims 
to control the growth of domestic credit to certain sectors" (Cappiello & Ferrucci, 2008, 
p.15). For example, the compulsory reserve requirement ratio on bank deposits increased 
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from 7.5 percent in July 2005 to 19.5 percent in May 2011 (PBOC, 2011). Nevertheless, as 
Hu (2010) points out, the root cause of China's liquidity problem, i.e., the rapid expansion 
of renminbi supply as a result of foreign exchange purchases has not been solved. Thus, if 
China wants to ensure price stability and, by doing so, to promote higher-quality economic 
growth, it must face a trade-off between exchange rate stability and interest rate 
liberalization, which is a key condition for the development of an independent and effective 
monetary policy. 
5.2 China's Large Hoarding of Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Also as a net result of China's current account surplus, its massive open-market 
foreign exchange interventions, as well as capital inflows responding to the incentives 
created by its rigid exchange rate policy, the PBOC has accumulated an extraordinarily 
large hoarding of foreign exchange reserve (now passed USD$3 trillion) with U.S. dollars 
making up a large part of the total. Given that China trades mostly with the United States, 
the choice of the U.S. dollar as the primary reserve currency is not surprising. However, the 
resultant rapid accumulation of U.S. dollar-denominated foreign assets-predominately in 
the form of the U.S. Treasury bills (T -bills )-entail some large risks and costs, and therefore 
has not been in the long-term interest of China. As Carden (2007) explains, China's 
ownership of vast amounts of U.S. T -bills-which are regarded as the least risky 
investment available on the planet-tends to yield a very low rate of return and is very 
likely to lose real value relative to the prices of non-dollar goods in the face of U.S. dollar 
depreciation. 
The Chinese authorities seem to be well aware of this problem, but the low yield 
does not seem to bother them much. They are, apparently, worried more about the fact that 
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around 70 percent of their foreign assets are dollar-denominated, so any sharp decline in 
the value of the U.S. dollar would mean huge capital losses on the balance sheet of the 
Chinese monetary authority (Krugman, 2009). "Suppose that the eventual dollar decline 
andre-equilibration of the renminbi result in a 20 percent capital loss for China. This 
would amount to USD$400 billion or roughly 10 percent of the Chinese GOP," according to 
economist Arvind Subramanian (2009). In fact, the threat of dollar deprecation has become 
more immediate due to the continuous deterioration in the fiscal balance of the U.S. 
economy. 
Certainly, China would like to tear itself away from the U.S. Treasury market, but as 
one might expect, "[a] precipitous action by China to shift aggressively out of U.S. dollar-
denominated instruments, or even an announcement of such an intention, could act as a 
trigger that nervous market sentiments coalesce around, leading to a sharp fall in bond 
prices and the value of the U.S. dollar" (Prasad, 2010). As a result, the Chinese authorities 
have shown few signs of attempting to weaken the dollar. The reason for this seems 
straightforward: such a move would not be without cost for China. After all, China is the 
world's largest dollar investor, and no one else would have less interest in seeing the value 
of the U.S. currency plummet than China would. In a recent New York Times column, Paul 
Krugman (2009) argues that China has in fact "driven itself into a 'dollar trap', and that it 
can neither get itself out nor change the policies that put it in that trap in the first place."17 
17 Recently, some Chinese policymakers argue that renminbi appreciation would have the same effect on the 
value of China's foreign exchange reserves. For example, in an article published on Caixin's Century Weekly 
on May 2, Anyuan Zhang, head of the fiscal and financial policy research division of the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC)'s Institute of Economic Research, predicted that China will lose USD$578.6 
billion in its foreign exchange reserves if the nominal RMB-USD bilateral exchange rate drops to 6. However, 
an unnamed official with China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) said in a statement May 6 
that renminbi appreciation will not directly reduce the value of China's foreign exchange reserves. According 
to the statement, the real purchasing power of China's foreign exchange reserves would remain unchanged 
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5.3 Banking Sector Reforms 
In order to prevent the risks of hyperinflation in the domestic economy, China's 
central bank must conduct large-scale, open-market sterilization operations. However, 
such sterilization may not only run into limits quickly, it entails some costs on the domestic 
banking system. These costs, which are likely to increase more than proportionally as the 
stock of China's foreign exchange reserves rises (Cappiello & Ferrucci, 2008), may in turn 
hamper banking sector reforms in China. According to Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008), 
China's open-market sterilization operations are normally carried out through sterilization 
bills issued by the central bank. As a rough estimate, the PBOC currently sterilizes around 
half of the increase in its foreign exchange reserves, and in March 2007, the outstanding 
stock of sterilization debt was around 40 percent of official reserves (Cappiello & Ferrucci, 
2008). However, as the total stock of sterilization bonds increases, the PBOC have to offer 
increasingly higher interest rates or yields to convince domestic economic agents to hold 
them. As Goldstein and Lardy (2009, p.28) point out, "Eventually, the interest the central 
bank pays on these bonds could exceed it earnings from its holdings of interest-bearing 
foreign currency-denominated financial assets, imposing a substantial financial constraint 
on sterilization operations." 
Equally important, such sterilization operations have also perpetuated large 
efficiency costs due to the provision of large amounts of low-yielding central bank bills 
mainly to inefficient state-owned enterprises (Dollar & Wei, 2007). According to some 
estimates, loans extended since 2002 represent around 57 percent of the total loan book of 
despite fluctuations in the renminbi exchange rate. Substantive changes would occur only when huge 
amounts of reserves are repatriated and converted to the renminbi, a scenario that is unlikely to happen 
because China faces no such pressure. 
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Chinese commercial banks (Setser, 2005). Thus, as Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008) expound, 
the health of China's banking system depends increasingly on the quality of the central 
bank loans extended during the current lending boom. If a fraction of these loans becomes 
non-performing, commercial banks in China could face huge capital losses. 
Furthermore, in order to control credit growth given the inability of the PBOC to use 
interest rates as a primary tool of monetary policy, the Chinese authorities have to resort to 
credit quotas such as required reserve ratios for individual banks as well as various types 
of "window guidance" on bank lending as mentioned earlier. This, however, "vitiates the 
process of banking reform by keeping banks' lending growth under the administrative 
guidance of the [PBOC] rather than letting it be guided by market signals" (Prasad, 2007, 
p.8). In the first quarter of 2011 alone, as inflationary pressures remain in the spotlight, the 
PBOC raised the ratio three times to a record high of 20 percent, based on its public 
statements (Back & Orlik, 2011). The upshot, according to Goldstein and Lardy (2009, 
p.30), is that the PBOC's need both to place large amounts of low-yielding sterilization bills 
with commercial banks and to repeatedly raise their requirement reserves (which likewise 
pay low interests) has an adverse impact on the profitability of these banks, and thus 
"hindering their transition to operation on a fully commercial basis." 
5.4 Rebalancing of the Chinese Economy 
Lastly, a few statistics quickly illustrate how skewed or unbalanced China's 
economic structure has become in recent years. According to Simon Tilford (2009, p.1), 
"While the household savings rate is running at over 20 percent of income, household 
consumption represented just 35 percent of GOP in 2008-an exceptionally low share by 
any standards." This is probably a product of social and culture forces, which still 
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emphasize savings. Nevertheless, China has been able to produce much more than it 
consumes by exporting the difference. The surge of cheap Chinese products has definitely 
benefited consumers in the advanced economies-notably the United States-by boosting 
their disposable incomes, but, at the same time, distorted China's economic structure. 
For their part, the Americans have been able to live beyond their means because of 
the readiness of the Chinese authorities to purchase huge quantities of U.S. government 
debts in the form of U.S. Treasury bonds and bills. This, according to Tilford (2009), is a 
reversal of the norm. "Developing countries usually import capital because their domestic 
savings are inadequate to meet their high investment needs ... For a developing country to 
be lending capital to the most important developed economy in order for it to buy the 
developing country's goods is not something that has happened before" (Tilford, 2009, p.2). 
However, Tilford (2009) continues to point out that if something cannot go on forever, it 
will not. Countries cannot run huge deficits indefinitely-not even the U.S. The recent 
global financial crisis has indeed demonstrated this. In fact, the current account deficits of 
big consumer countries like the U.S. are narrowing, and this trend will likely to continue. 
U.S. households, for example, are likely to save more in the years ahead, and hence 
consume less. The Obama administration has recently made plain that the world can no 
longer rely on the U.S. acting as the "consumer of last resort." It is against this backdrop 
that many Chinese policymakers have started to fear that Chinese exports will never again 
play the same role in driving growth in the Chinese economy. 
Indeed, China's leadership is aware that there needs to be a rebalancing of its 
economy if the country is to maintain its rapid economic growth. For example, in a recent 
government work report to the annual parliamentary session, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao 
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said: "We should focus on restructuring the economy, and make greater effort to enhance 
the role of domestic demand, especially consumption, in spurring growth." The Chinese 
government knows that sustainable growth requires a very big shift from external to 
domestic demand. This, however, requires the Chinese people to produce less and to 
consume more of what they produce. Thus, in order to put the Chinese economy on a sound 
footing, China must shift towards a more consumption-based economy. 
A more flexible exchange rate regime while not the only answer to the imbalance 
problem of the Chinese economy, it is an essential part of the issue. With it, China can 
transition to a consumption-driven growth path at a much faster pace since a renminbi 
appreciation would reduce the growth of exports and increase the growth of imports, and 
thereby promoting a more efficient allocation of domestic resources between the tradable 
and non-tradable sectors. Without it, the problem cannot be resolved. As Prasad (2007, 
p.10) points out, "The case for a flexible exchange rate rests on a deeper set of policy 
priorities, with the ultimate objective being balanced and sustainable growth in the longer 
term." This, in fact, is very much in the interest of China's vast population. 
CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUDING REMARKS 
By reviewing the Chinese and western literature, this paper finds that the latest 
debates on the renminbi exchange rate regime in China mirror those in the west. 
Specifically, there are same rival camps both inside and outside China surrounding two key 
issues - first, whether the renminbi is significantly undervalued, and second, whether 
China would benefit from adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
With respect to the first issue, one camp, i.e., CASS economists Ming Zhang (2010c, 
2011) and Yongding Yu (2010) along with some western economists [e.g., Rossi (2005), 
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Cline and Williamson (2007), Goldstein and Lardy (2008)] support the IMF (2006)'s 
position that the renminbi is substantially undervalued. However, in response to 
accusations ofrenminbi undervaluation, the other camp which includes high-level officials 
in China (e.g., Wen (2006)] and some Chinese academics such as professors Yu Zhang, 
Haiping Qiu, and Wei ping Huang at Renmin University and professor Jiandong Ju at 
Tsinghua University1B disagree with the argument that China's large and growing current 
account surplus proves that the renminbi is significantly undervalued. They argue that a 
structural reduction in the balance of payments surplus was already unfolding in China 
thanks to steps taken to boost domestic consumption. They also retorted that greater 
pressure from abroad for more rapid exchange rate reform would only slow the process 
down since there had not been any consensus on the degree of renminbi undervaluation 
(e.g., People's Daily, 13/05/2005). 
However, does it matter how much the renminbi is undervalued? Is the degree of 
undervaluation the primary focus of the current renminbi debate? The answers are no. As 
discussed earlier, an independent monetary policy, which is a crucial tool for improving 
domestic macroeconomic management and promoting stable economic growth and low 
inflation, "requires a flexible exchange rate, not a one-off revaluation or a sequence of 
revaluations" (Prasad, 2007, p.13). As Prasad (2007, p.13) explains, "A flexible exchange 
rate buffers some of the effects of interest rate changes, especially in offsetting the 
temptation for capital to flow in or out in response to such changes. A one-off revaluation 
can solve this problem temporarily but could create even more problems subsequently if 
interest rate actions in a different direction become necessary, or if investor sentiment and 
18 Meetings with these Chinese Economics professors were undertaken in Beijing in November 2010. 
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the pressures for capital inflows or outflows shift." Hence, the increase of the flexibility of 
the renminbi exchange rate regime is more important than a mere appreciation of the 
renminbi, concurs CASS economists Zhang (2010b) and Yu (2010). 
With respect to the second issue, the commonality the two camps share is the 
viewpoint that a more flexible renminbi exchange rate is in China's own best interests as it 
can resolve many of the challenges and obstacles posed by its current tightly managed 
exchange rate regime that have been highlighted in the previous chapter. It would not only 
allow the PBOC to gain more control over China's domestic monetary conditions given its 
excessive accumulation of foreign exchange reserves that has accompanied the increasingly 
undervalued renminbi and other factors, it would also prevent further buildup of liquidity 
in the domestic financial system, thereby promoting banking sector reforms in China. In 
addition, a more flexible exchange rate regime can support China's transition to a more 
balanced and sustained growth path by reducing the reliance of exports and promoting 
domestic consumption. Hence, "[a] strong argument can be made for an early move 
towards greater exchange rate flexibility, irrespective of whether or not the renminbi is 
substantially undervalued" (Cappiello & Ferrucci, 2008, p.8). 
Albeit there is no real dispute between the two camps both inside and outside China 
that the renminbi exchange rate has to become more flexible, what can we say about the 
speed of the adjustment? The Chinese authorities representing one camp have repeatedly 
stated their resolve to move toward increased exchange rate flexibility. However, as 
Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008) point out, they have also expressed concerns that some 
conditions have to be in place to ensure a smooth transition to a more flexible renminbi 
exchange rate system. "In particular, a number of institutional reforms have to be 
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implemented in order to prepare the economic system to manage exchange rate risk. These 
include developing a proper foreign exchange market, where the central bank shifts from 
acting as a rate-setter to a supervisory role, and introducing more sophisticated hedging 
instruments. The financial and non-financial corporate sectors will also have to learn to 
adapt to increased foreign exchange risk" (Cappiello & Ferrucci, 2008, p.29). Thus, they 
argue that a sudden move toward a fully floating renminbi exchange rate regime is not 
advisable, and therefore should not be envisaged, in the short to medium term. 
The other camp [e.g., Prasad (2007), Goldstein and Lardy (2008), Yu (2010), and 
Zhang (2011)] disagrees, arguing that an independent monetary policy that is able to guide 
credit expansion through domestic interest rate adjustments is essential to encourage 
commercial banks to become more robust financial institutions. Consequently, it is also a 
key input into durable banking sector reforms in China. Nevertheless, the Chinese 
authorities often express concern that, given the fragility and underdevelopment of the 
country's financial and banking system, more exchange rate flexibility-which is the key 
ingredient for an independent monetary policy-could be disastrous in the event of a sharp 
increase in the value of the renminbi as it could destroy bank balance sheets (Prasad, 
2007). However, according to Prasad (2007, p.14), "there is little evidence that Chinese 
banks have large exposures to foreign currency assets or external liabilities denominated 
in renminbi that would hurt their balance sheets greatly if the renminbi were to appreciate 
in the short run." 
In addition, according to Zhang (2010c), over the past few years, especially since the 
onset of the recent global financial crisis in 2008, the world's advanced economies such as 
the US, the EU and Japan have been experiencing relatively slow economic growth, whereas 
49 
newly industrialized countries (NIC) including China have been experiencing higher 
growth. For the advanced economies, their primary goal after the crisis is to stimulate 
domestic economic growth. However, due to their worsening fiscal deficit and government 
debt problems, there is not much leeway for further fiscal stimulus. Also against the 
backdrop of high unemployment, these countries have put promoting export growth at top 
of their priority lists. Thus, driving down the values of their currencies and pressuring the 
NICs to appreciate their ones have become their main strategy. As advanced economies 
notably the United States resort to quantitative easing policies to depreciate their 
currencies in an effort to promote export growth, and as NICs like China continue to 
interfere in the foreign exchange market to prevent their currencies from appreciating, a 
global currency war has thus begun (Zhang, 2010c). What are the implications of such a 
global currency war for China? As Zhang (2010c) expounds, the rejection by the Chinese 
authorities of any call for the increase in the flexibility of the renminbi exchange rate 
regime and thus a renminbi appreciation large enough to make a real dent in China's 
current account surplus may exacerbate the problem and create a lose-lose situation for 
China and the rest of the world-notably the advanced economies. 
So how then can we explain the glacial pace of exchange rate reform in China? Why 
are the Chinese authorities reluctant to let its exchange rate regime become much more 
flexible? They are, in fact, more concerned about the potential economic costs associated 
with greater exchange rate flexibility. Their primary concern, according to Cappiello and 
Ferrucci (2008), is that a much more flexible exchange rate regime under which a 
significant appreciation of the renminbi is likely to occur may hurt China's external 
competitiveness, thereby reducing export growth and weakening FDI inflows. Since export 
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growth has been an important engine of China's spectacular economic performance in the 
past decades, it is feared that a weakened export capacity may jeopardize overall growth 
prospects and be disastrous for employment and hence, social stability. This may be an 
important reason why exchange rate reform is a highly politically sensitive issue in China. 
A related concern is that higher renminbi exchange rate under a flexible exchange 
rate regime could adversely affect rural incomes in the country (Cappiello & Ferrucci, 
2008). As Cappiello and Ferrucci (2008) expound, the Chinese rural sector is widely 
believed to be internationally uncompetitive due to the large amount of surplus labor 
combined with low productivity growth. Consequently, the Chinese policymakers fear that 
a fall in domestic prices of food imports resulting from a renminbi appreciation may have 
significant adverse consequences for farmers. The upshot is that although a more flexible 
exchange rate regime which would bring about a significant appreciation of the renminbi 
would be beneficial for the Chinese economy as a whole, the benefits would not be shared 
equally among different sectors of the economy. 
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